Engaging Armed NSAs in a
Landmine Ban: A Review of Geneva Call’s
Action, 2000–2007
Geneva Call has been engaging armed non-state
actors in a landmine ban since 2000. The Swissbased nongovernmental organization was created in
response to the realization that the landmine problem
could only be comprehensively addressed if NSAs,
who are the primary users of such weapons today,
were included in the solution. To this end, Geneva
Call has developed an innovative mechanism—the
Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban
on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine
Action1—that enables NSAs, who cannot accede to
the Ottawa Convention,2 to undertake to respect
its norms.
by Pascal Bongard [ Geneva Call ]
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n November 2007, seven years after its launch, Geneva Call released
a comprehensive review of the work it has carried out with its partners to advocate the mine ban among non-state actors. The review,
Engaging Armed Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban: The Geneva Call
Progress Report (2000–2007), 3 which is largely based on the findings of
an internal assessment4 and research efforts conducted by Geneva Call, 5
documents the progress accomplished to date and the challenges that
lie ahead. In an effort to further enhance the effectiveness of engaging
NSAs in the future, it also provides practical recommendations.
Progress to Date
The report notes that, by its publication, 34 NSAs from Burma/
Myanmar, Burundi, India, Iraq, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan,
Turkey and Western Sahara had signed the Deed of Commitment.6 This
achievement is noteworthy because many of these groups were previously involved in the use and production of anti-personnel mines; additionally, as a result of Geneva Call and its partners’ efforts, eight other
NSAs have pledged to prohibit or limit the use of AP mines, either unilaterally or through a ceasefire agreement with the government.
Since 2000, signatory NSAs have, for the most part, complied with
their obligations under the Deed of Commitment by refraining from
using AP mines, cooperating in mine action with specialized organizations and, for some of them, destroying their stockpiles. Nearly all
signatories have cooperated with Geneva Call’s monitoring of their

Destruction of more than 3,300 stockpiled anti-personnel mines by the Polisario Front,
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compliance by providing information on the measures they have taken
to implement the Deed of Commitment and facilitating field verification missions.
In some countries, the signing of the Deed of Commitment precipitated the launch of much-needed mine-action programs by specialized
organizations in areas under the control of signatory NSAs. Such progress has occurred, for example, in southern Sudan and Western Sahara,
where international involvement in humanitarian mine action was limited, if not nonexistent, before the signing.
Signatory NSAs have been instrumental in the accession to and
implementation of the Ottawa Convention by their respective states. In
Sudan, the signing of the Deed of Commitment by the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/Army in 2001 was a key consideration in the
government’s decision to ratify the Ottawa Convention two years later.7 In Iraq, officials of the Kurdish NSAs who became members of the
national government after the fall of Saddam Hussein regime in 2003
encouraged the government to join the Convention. Iraq acceded to the
Ottawa Convention in 2007, as one of the very few states in the region
to have done so.
Geneva Call’s initiative has received increased support from the
international community. States Parties to the Ottawa Convention, the
United Nations, intergovernmental bodies such as the European Union
and the African Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross,
and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines have repeatedly
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acknowledged that progress towards a minef ree world wou ld be en ha nced i f NSAs
observed the Ottawa Convention’s provisions
and have supported efforts to engage NSAs.
Challenges
Although much progress has been made,
engaging NSAs in a mine ban has not been
without its challenges. Many NSAs still have
not agreed to the Deed of Commitment and
continue to resort to AP mines and/or victimact ivated improv ised ex plosive dev ices.
Among them are major users and producers
such as Colombian guerrillas and Burmese
opposition groups, which are reluctant to
renounce these weapons; moreover, several
NSAs retain large stocks of AP mines in territories under their control.
Progress in the implementation of the
Deed of Commitment has been slowed by
the lack of technical assistance and resources
available to signatory NSAs and Geneva Call.
A number of signatories have been unable, for
example, to undertake mine action on their
own—particularly mine clearance, stockpile
destruction and victim assistance—due to
their limited technical knowledge and lack of
qualified manpower, equipment and funding.
A lack of funding has also affected the capacity of Geneva Call and its technical partners
to support mine action in areas under the
control of signatory groups.
A related challenge has been to ensure
that all signatories fully comply with the
Deed of Commitment. Some groups have
experienced dif f icu lties in getting t heir
rank and file to adhere to all obligations. A
few others have not yet provided details on
their AP mine stocks nor proceeded with the
destruction of such mines.
In some cou nt r ies, G eneva C a l l ha s
encountered problems in accessing NSAs
operating in remote areas. In other cases,

sa fet y concerns a nd f ight ing have ha mpered t he implementation a nd monitoring of the Deed of Commitment. In Somalia
for instance, a volatile security situation and
renewed clashes in 2006 prevented Geneva
Call and its technical partners from inspecting mine stocks held by signatory factions and
arranging for their destruction.
Although most states concerned with
NSAs have cooperated with Geneva Call, a
small number of them have made the work
challenging. Turkey has consistently opposed
engagement with the Kurdistan Workers’
Party, a group it considers a “terrorist” organization, arguing that this would confer it
legitimacy. Though not objecting to the principle of NSA engagement, a few other states
have restricted Geneva Call’s access to areas
where NSAs operate or have obstructed mineaction efforts by specialized organizations.
Results
Since the launch of Geneva Call in 2000,
significant progress has been made in engaging NSAs in the landmine ban. Thirty-five
armed groups have now signed the Deed of
Commitment and, for the most part, have
abided by its terms; moreover, in some countries, their commitment has facilitated the
launch of new mine-action programs by specialized organizations as well as the accession
to the Ottawa Convention by their respective states. Many cha llenges remain, but
Geneva Call’s Progress Report illustrates how
NSA engagement work can be effective in
securing their compliance with the Ottawa
Convention’s provisions.
See Endnotes, page 113
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Mongooses, Robots Team up for Demining
A team of Sri Lankan researchers has been testing a new system for clearing minefields. This
system involves the use of trained mongooses, which possess a heightened sense of smell, to
detect buried explosives.
The mongooses are tethered to remote-controlled robots, which carry small video cameras that
detect the precise location of a buried explosive. Researchers say the system is particularly
beneficial because the combined weight of each pair is insufficient to trigger a landmine.
In one test, according to reports, the robot-mongoose team took just 30 seconds to locate a
buried landmine a few feet away from where it started.
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